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Illegally
Evading
Attribution?
Russia's Use of Unmarked Troops
in Crimea and International Humanitarian Law
Ines Gillich*

ABSTRACT

The Crimean Crisis of Februaryand March 2014 poses several questions to InternationalLaw. This Article explores one of
them: Does the use of unmarked troops, soldiers in uniforms but
without nationality insignia, in Crimea violate principles of InternationalHumanitarianLaw (IHL)?
This Article first provides a brief summary of Crimea's history and the facts of the 2014 Crimean Crisis. It will be argued
that IHL is applicable to the events in Crimea in February and
March 2014 since the unmarked soldiers are attributable to
Russia-either as Russian nationals or through Russia's exercise of control over them-and that there was no valid consent
given justifying an "intervention by invitation." The Article will
argue that the principle of distinction under IHL is not violated
since it requires only that combatants should be distinguishable
from the civilianpopulation but does not requirea link between
the combatant and a particularparty to the conflict. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that IHL regarding military uniforms leaves states a broad area of discretion as to the appearance of a military uniform and does not oblige combatants to
visibly disclose their nationality by wearing emblems or insignia. This Article will also argue that the use of unmarked soldiers in the case at hand does not amount to illegal perfidy under IHL but-absent clear legal provisions and noticeable
examples from state practice-must be regarded as a lawful
ruse of war. Lastly, the final Part will consider whether it is
wise to amend the current legal rules in order to prohibit the use
of unmarked soldiers in similar situations arising in future
armed conflicts and will spell out a recommendation.

Dr. iur. (Ph.D. equivalent), Johannes Gutenberg-University of Mainz, Germany;
LL.M., University of California at Los Angeles. I thank Professor Ash Bili, UCLA
School of Law, for her support and advice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Crimean Crisis of February and March 2014, which eventually culminated-under the sharp protest of western states-in the
incorporation of Crimea into the Federal Republic of Russia, marked
for Ukraine a key event in the course of its still young history as a
sovereign state. It also confronted the international community of
states with barely foreseeable challenges to fundamental principles of
international law, such as the sanctity of the principle of sovereignty
and territorial integrity. The events that occurred in Crimea in February and March 2014 also pose questions to fundamental principles
of the laws of war or International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This
Article will analyze one of them: it explores the question of whether
the use of unmarked troops, meaning uniformed military troops
without nationality insignia, in circumstances like those arisen in
Crimea, violates IHL.
Beginning in late February 2014, unmarked military personnel
suddenly appeared in Crimea and, alongside Crimean "self-defense"
forces, subsequently took control over key strategic and military
facilities in the peninsula. The unexpected appearance of these unmarked soldiers-referred to by some commentators as the "little
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green men scenario"'-left both the Ukrainian authorities and western states puzzled about the affiliation of these troops. Without any
doubt, these unmarked soldiers played a critical role in Crimea's fate.
In order to address this problem, this Article first gives a brief
overview of the background of the 2014 Crimean Crisis within its
broader historical and political context (Part II). The following legal
analysis (Part III) then begins with a classification of the nature of
the conflict in Crimea for the purposes of finding the applicable legal
framework. It will be established that an international armed conflict
between Ukraine on the one side and Ukrainian rebels and Russia on
the other side exists. It will be argued that the unmarked soldiers are
attributable to Russia for the purposes of internationalizing the
conflict because those soldiers are Russian special forces and, alternatively, Russia exercises control over them. Furthermore, there is no
valid consent given by the Crimean local authorities and the Ukrainian President to an intervention by invitation, which would prevent
the conflict from becoming internationalized. The legal analysis then
goes on to identify whether substantive norms of the law of international armed conflicts are violated by the use of unmarked soldiers
(Part IV). The analysis focuses on central principles of IHL governing
the conduct of the parties to an armed conflict: the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, the rules regarding military uniforms, and the prohibition of perfidy as contrasted to lawful
ruses of war. The legal analysis will conclude that none of these
principles are violated in the case at hand. This is because the current framework of IHL provides only vague standards and does not
clearly prohibit the use of unmarked soldiers. The final Part will
discuss whether this legal gap should be filled by amending the
current rules of IHL (Part V).

II. THE 2014 CRIMEAN CRISIS

The Crimean Peninsula, which is connected with the southern
part of the Ukrainian mainland by a narrow strip of land (Isthmus of
Perekop), occupies a strategically important location on the northern
coast of the Black Sea. On its eastern border, it is separated from the
Russian region of Kuban by the Strait of Kerch. Today, Crimea is
populated by an ethnic Russian majority and a minority of ethnic

1.
Breedlove: Hybrid Warfare in NATO Nations Opens Door to Invoke Article
5, SPUTNIK INT'L (Sept. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Breedlove], http://en.ria.ru/military
news/20140916/192977784/Breedlove-Hybrid-Warfare-in-NATO-Nations-Opens-Doorto-Invoke.html [http://perma.cclNZ52-C5TM] (archived Sept. 18, 2015) (quoting NATO
Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Philip M. Breedlove).

1194

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 48:1191

Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. Throughout its history, Crimea has
always been of geostrategic interest to various outside forces. 2
In 1783, Crimea became part of the Russian Empire and, with
the end of the Russian Empire in 1917, a sovereign state until 1921
when it was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1945, after its liberation by the
Red Army from German occupation during WWII, Crimea became an
administrative region of Russia (the Crimean Oblast).3 In 1954, to the
surprise of many political commentators, Nikita Khrushchev, Premier
of the Soviet Union, gave the Crimean Oblast to the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic.4
With the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine
gained sovereignty. Crimea remained part of Ukraine but was granted significant autonomy, including the right to have its own constitution and legislature. In 1999, the "Partition Treaty on the Status and
Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet" between Ukraine and Russia
entered into force. 5 Under this treaty, the Black Sea Fleet, which was
located in the Crimean peninsula at the time, was partitioned between Russia (81.7 percent) and Ukraine (18.3 percent), with Russia
maintaining the right to use the Port of Sevastopol in Ukraine for
twenty years until 2017. The treaty also granted Russia the right to
station up to 25,000 troops and naval personnel, twenty-four artillery
systems, 132 armored vehicles, and twenty-two military planes on its
bases in Crimea.6

2.

See PAUL R. MAGOCSI, A HISTORY OF UKRAINE: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLES

182 (2nd ed. 2010) (providing a background on the history of Ukraine and Crimea,
where in, ancient times, Crimea's southern region (then referred to as the Tauric
Peninsula) was colonized by the Greek and Roman Empires. Later, Crimea was
dominated by the Byzantine and then by the Ottoman Empire. The modern name
"Crimea" derives from the Crimean Tatars' language, a Turkic ethnic group that
emerged during the Crimean Khanate under the Ottoman Empire, meaning "fortress").
3.
Under Russian authority, the entire population of Crimean Tatars and a
large number of Greeks and Armenians living in Crimea were deported to Central
Asia, leaving a vast majority of ethnic Russians in Crimea. The Tatars were not
allowed to return to Crimea until the end of Soviet Union. Cf. GRETA LYNN UEHLING,
BEYOND MEMORY: THE CRIMEAN TATARS' DEPORTATION AND RETURN (2004) (describing

measures taken by the Soviet authorities against Crimean Tatars).
4.
The reasons for this move are subject to speculation. See ROBERT H.
DONALDSON, JOSEPH L. NOGEE & VIDYA NADKARNI, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA

174 (5th ed. 2014) (explaining that Khrushchev maintained close ties with Crimea).
5.
Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Status
and Conditions of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet's Stay on Ukrainian Territory, Russ.-Ukr., May 28, 1997, Rossiiskaia gazeta (entered into force July 12, 1999).
This treaty was extended for twenty-five years by the Russian-Ukrainian Naval Base
for Natural Gas Treaty, Russ.-Ukr., Apr. 21, 2010, Rossiiskaia gazeta. On 28 March
2014, Russia denounced this treaty.
See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, Questions and Answers: Russia, Ukraine, and
6.
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, (Mar. 22, 2014) [hereinafter
HUM. RTS. WATCH, Q&A Russia, Ukraine], http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/21/
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In late 2013, after Ukrainian President Yanukovich declined to
sign a trade and cooperation agreement with the European Union,
massive and violent demonstrations began in Kiev and quickly spread
out to other parts of Ukraine. On February 21, 2014, Yanukovych fled
Kiev. One day later, he was removed from office, and an interim
government was installed.7 Russia claimed the new government as
illegitimate.8
As from February 27, 2014, Russian-speaking armed personnel
in uniforms without insignia and nationality emblems suddenly
appeared in Crimea.9 These troops gradually seized control over key
military and governmental buildings as well as other strategic facilities and raised Russian flags. 10 They also surrounded Ukrainian
military bases hindering Ukrainian soldiers from leaving their stations.11 While these unmarked men mainly referred to themselves as
"Crimean self-defense forces," they occasionally answered to journalists that they were Russian special forces. 12 According to Human
Rights Watch, at least parts of these units were Russian personnel.13

questions-and-answers-russia-ukraine-and-international-humanitarian-and-humanrigh-0 [https://perma.cclETQ3-6YVK] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) ("As of 2013, approximately 13,000 Russian naval personnel were based in Crimea.").
See International Crisis Group, Ukraine: Running out of Time, Europe
7.
Report, No. 231 at 1 (May 14, 2014), http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/europe/
ukraine/231-ukraine-running-out-of-time.pdf [http://perma.cc/4S2G-KKSJ] (archived
Oct. 10, 2015).
See MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE Russ. FED'N., 361-24-02-2014,
8.
STATEMENT BY THE RuSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REGARDING THE EVENTS IN

http://www.mid.rulbrp_4.nsf/0/
2014),
24,
(Feb.
UKRAINE
(archived
[http://perma.cc/Y3QE-5T65]
86DDB7AF9CD146C844257C8A003C57D2
Sept. 20, 2015) ("We are deeply concerned about the actions in the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada in terms of their legitimacy.").
9.
See Allison Smale & Steven Erlanger, Ukraine Mobilizes Reserve Troops,
Threatening War, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/02/world/europeukraine.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/B955-79XE] (archived Sept. 20,
2015).
See id.
10.
See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, Q&A Russia, Ukraine, supra note 6
11.
("Russian armed personnel and pro-Russian militias in Crimea have prevented Ukrainian armed forces from leaving their bases.").
12.
Masha Lipman, Putin's Crisis Spreads, NEW YORKER (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/putins-crisis-spreads
[http://perma.cc/C33S-GPSW] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). See generally Will Englund,
Ukraine's Ousted President Surfaces in Russia, Says He Is Still Head of State, WASH.
POST (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gunmens-seizure-ofparliament-building-stokes-tensions-in-ukraines-crimea/2014/02/27/2539871c-9f8311e3-9ba6-800d1l92dO8b-story.html [https://perma.cc/3WQQ-VL99] (archived Sept.
19, 2015) (reporting that Russia began military preparedness drills involving 150,000
troops).
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, Q&A Russia, Ukraine, supra note 6; Jacob W. Kipp
13.
& Roger McDermott, Putin's Smart Defense: Wars, Rumors of War, and Generationsof
Wars (Part One), EURASIA DAILY MONITOR (June 10, 2014), http://www.jamestown.org/
programs/edm/single/?tx ttnews%5bttnews%5d=42480&txttnews%5bbackPid%5d=
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They were spotted using military equipment registered for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. 14
The following events then came thick and fast. In a UN Security
Council meeting on March 1, 2014, the representative of Russia
asserted that the Prime Minister of Crimea, supported by Mr. Yanukovych, had requested the Russian President for assistance to restore
peace in Crimea.1 5 On the same day, the Russian Federation Council,
approving a request from President Vladimir Putin, authorized the
use of armed force in Ukraine.1 6 Within the next few days, the number of Russian naval personnel stationed at the Black Sea Fleet was
increased.' 7 On March 3, 2014, the Council of the European Union
condemned what happened as a clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression committed by the
Russian armed forces as well as the authorization given by the Russian Federation Council for the use of the armed force on the territory
of Ukraine. "The E.U. called on Russia to immediately withdraw its
armed forces to the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with the [Black Sea Fleet Agreement]."' 8
In a live address on Russian television on March 4, 2014, Russian President Putin denied that the unmarked soldiers in Crimea
were Russian forces and qualified them as "pro-Russian local selfdefense forces."' 9 Similarly, the Russian Minister of Defense dis756&no..cache=1#.VBzNtUtV64h [http://perma.cc/5HU9-EM57] (archived Sept. 20,
2015).
14.
See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, Q&A Russia, Ukraine, supra note 6
(reporting that many journalists have seen forces with equipment and vehicles that
Ukranian forces are not known to own); Smale & Erlanger, supra note 9 (stating that
Russian troops had no identifying insignia but had military vehicles registered with
Russian license plates).
15.
See Kathy Lally, Will Englund & William Booth, Russian Parliament
Approves Use of Troops in Ukraine, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Lally,
Russianparliament],http://www.washingtonpost.com/worldleurope/russian-parliamentapproves-use-of-troops-in-crimea/2014/03/01/dl775f70-al51-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7
story.html [https://perma.cc/T6GU-AGQN] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).
16.
See id. (explaining that Russia justified this step with the need to protect
Russian citizens and military based in Crimea).
17.
See Warning Shots End OSCE Crimea Entry Bid, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 8
2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/warning-shots-end-osce-crimeaentry-bid-20143815135639790.html [http://perma.cc/J7HA-ZNNV] (archived Sept. 17,
2015) (reporting that the Ukrainian Government, as of March 2014, believes the
number of Russian troops in Kiev have amounted to 30,000, whereas the U.S. Department of Defense equates the number to be closer to 20,000).
18.
EUR. UNION, EU Sanctions Against Russia Over Ukraine Crisis,
EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions/index_
en.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2014) [http://perma.ce/E3XQ-YUFYJ (archived Sept. 20,
2015).
19.
Shaun Walker, Russian Takeover of Crimea Will Not Descend into War,
Says Vladimir Putin, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/mar/04/ukraine-crisis-russian-troops-crimea-john-kerry-kiev [http://perma.ce/62942TGN] (archived Oct. 11, 2015); see also European Council Conclusions on Ukraine,
Brussels European Council (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/
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missed reports about the presence of Russian troops in Crimea as
"nonsense" and added that he had no idea how modern Russian
military equipment and armored vehicles with Russian military
license plates had ended up in Crimea.20 However, on April 17, in his
annual televised question-and-answer session with the Russian
nation, Putin admitted that the troops in unmarked uniforms had
been Russian soldiers. 2 1
In a referendum held in Crimea on March 16, 2014, that was
organized by the local authorities but opposed by the Ukrainian
government, a vast majority (97 percent, according to figures provided by the Crimean authorities) of the Crimean population voted in
favor of secession from Ukraine.2 2 Two days later, Russian President
Putin and the Crimean authorities signed the "Agreement on the
accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and on
23
Forming New Constituent Entities within the Russian Federation."
Russian military units, now openly acting in Crimea, took over the

cms-data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/141291.pdf [http://perma.cc/SZD2-FJWH] (archived
Sept. 20, 2015) (rejecting Russia's denial about the presence of Russian troops in
Crimea); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PRESIDENT PUTIN's FICTION: 10 FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT

UKRAINE (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps/2014/03/222988.htm
[http://perma.cclZC89-AAVF (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (listing Putin's ten "false
claims" about Ukraine: "Strong evidence suggests that members of Russian security
services are at the heart of the highly organized anti-Ukraine forces in Crimea. While
these units wear uniforms without insignia, they drive vehicles with Russian military
license plates and freely identify themselves as Russian security forces when asked by
the international media and the Ukrainian military. Moreover, these individuals are
armed with weapons not generally available to civilians.").
Lipman, supra note 12.
20.
See Putin Says No Russian Troops in East Ukraine, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 17,
21.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/04/putin-says-no-russian-troops2014),
east-ukraine-2014417132436806530.html [http://perma.cc/8KBS-7TJM] (archived Sept.
17, 2015) ("He did admit, for the first time, that the troops in unmarked uniforms who
had captured Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula before its annexation last month by
Moscow were Russian soldiers."); Vladimir Ischenkov, Putin Admits Russian Soldiers
Sent to Crimea, STUFF.CO.NZ (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.stuff.co.nz/worldleurope/
9956314/Putin-admits-Russian-soliders-sent-to-Crimea (subscription required) [http://
perma.cclCMC6-5HPJ] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) ("Putin said they were Russian
servicemen who 'stood behind the back of Crimea's self-defence forces' ..... 'They acted
politely, but resolutely and professionally."').
22.
See Press Release, OCSE, OSCE Chair Says Crimean Referendum in Its
Current Form Is Illegal and Calls for Alternative Ways to Address the Crimean Issue
(Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.osce.org/cio/116313 [http://perma.cc/LR3W-EF2P] (archived
Sept. 20, 2015) (qualifying the referendum as illegal and therefore refusing to send an
observer mission).
23.
The Kremlin, Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the
Russian Federation Signed (Mar. 18, 2014), http://eng.kremlin.rulnews/6890
[http://perma.cclY7CY-BHNR] (archived Sept. 20, 2015). See generally International
Crisis Group, Ukraine Running Out of Time, Europe Report No. 231 (14 May 2014)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/ukraine/231-ukraine-running-out-oftime.pdf [http://perma.cc/53CH-EMV5] (archived Nov. 14, 2015) (providing a summary
of the events following the annexation).
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remaining Ukrainian military bases and forced the Ukrainian troops
to leave the peninsula. 24
Despite vigorous international protest against Russia's actions, 25
Ukraine and the international community in the end found themselves as bystanders in a chain of events, by which-within just a
short period of time-hardly reversible facts on the ground were
created.

III. APPLICATION OF IHL TO CRIMEA 2014

As long as wars exist, there have been efforts to contain the
methods of warfare in legally binding norms. The modern law of war
evolved in the nineteenth century with the first codifications in the
Lieber Code. 26 Today, the legal sources of IHL can be found in international treaty law, most prominently in the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as in international customary law. IHL is applicable in situations of an international or noninternational armed
conflict and sets out legally binding rules and standards of conduct
for all parties to the conflict. A party who violates these norms com-

24.
See David M. Herszenhorn, Patrick Reevell & Noah Sneider, Russian
Forces Take Over One of the Last Ukrainian Bases in Crimea, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=o
[https://
perma.cc/8769-XFXK?type=source] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).
25.
See, e.g, Press Release, European Commission, The Brussels G7 Summit
Declaration (June 5, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release-MEMO-14-402_en.htm
[http://perma.cc/3GZZ-H625] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (noting the "unacceptable
interference in Ukraine's
sovereign
affairs by the Russian Federation
[and] ... condemning the Russian Federation's continuing violation of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ukraine Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. . . ."); Press
Release, NATO, Wales Summit Declaration (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official texts 112964.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[http://perma.cc/2YNT-YEP9]
(archived Sept. 20, 2015) ("We condemn in the strongest terms Russia's escalating and
illegal military intervention in Ukraine and demand that Russia stop and withdraw its
forces.. . . This violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious
breach of international law ... . We do not and will not recognise Russia's illegal and
illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea."); see also G.A. Res. 68/262 Territorial Integrity of
Ukraine (Mar. 27, 2014) (vote 100 in favor, 11 against, 58 abstentions); Press Release,
General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to
Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, U.N. Press Release GA/1 1493 (Mar. 27,
2014),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/gall493.doc.htm
[http://perma.cc/
PC39-X7QQ] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
26.
See Francia Lieber, Lieber Instructions 1863: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3, 3-20 (Dietrich

Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 2004) [hereinafter Lieber Code]. The Lieber Code has had
a great influence on later codifications of the law of war. See generally RICHARD SHELLY
HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 1 (1983).
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mits an international wrongful act leading to international legal
responsibility. 27
The events in Crimea in 2014 raise a number of fundamental
legal questions, which have been addressed elsewhere.28 The following analysis will only focus on the question of whether the use of
unmarked soldiers by Russia violates IHL. 29 First, the application of
IHL to the conflict in Crimea at the time of the first appearance of
unmarked soldiers in late February 2014 will be examined. The
application of IHL requires the existence of an "armed conflict," either
noninternational or international in nature. The correct delineation

27.
See Shane Darcy, What Future for the Doctrine of Belligerent Reprisals?,
2002 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 107 (arguing states that are violated may take
reprisals against the wrongdoer and defining "belligerent reprisals" as "prima facie
unlawful acts taken against a party to an armed conflict that is violating the law for
the purpose of coercing that party to cease its unlawful conduct").
28.
See, e.g., Chris Borgen, Can Crimea Secede by Referendum?, OPINIO JURIS
(Mar. 6, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/06/can-crimea-secede-referendum
[http://perma.cc/4M7J-7JSN] (archived Sept. 18, 2015) (arguing, with reference to the
ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence, that Crimea has no
right to secede); Simon Chesterman, Crimean War 2.0: Ukraine and InternationalLaw,
STRAITS TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2408872 [http://perma.cc/
5KYY-3QG7] (archived Oct. 11, 2015) (qualifying Russia's deployment of additional
military forces beyond the limits set forth in the Black Sea Fleet Agreement as an
armed intervention and analyzing the legality of the Crimean referendum under
Ukrainian constitutional law); cf. Anne Peters, Das Volkerrecht der Gebietsreferenden:
Das Beispiel der Ukraine 1991-2014 [The InternationalLaw of TerritorialReferendums: The Example of Ukraine 1991-2014], 64 OSTEUROPA 5, 101 (2014),
http://ssrn.comlabstract=2476935 [http://perma.cc/EFK7-DT9F] (archived Sept. 20,
2015) (describing the international law of territorial referendums with reference to the
Crimean Crisis in 2014); Robert W. McGee, The Crimean Secession: A Comment on
Chesterman's 'Crimean War 2.0: Ukraine and International Law' (Apr. 7, 2014),
http://ssrn.comlabstract=2422035 [http://perma.cclR32B-URHX] (archived Sept. 20,
2015) (discussing a right of secession); Shane Reeves, To Russia with Love: How Moral
Arguments for a HumanitarianIntervention in Syria Opened the Door for an Invasion
of the Ukraine, 23 MICH. STATE INT'L L.R. 199 (Apr. 29, 2014) (discussing grounds for
humanitarian intervention in Crimea).
29.
So far, this legal problem has only been addressed in press articles but has
not been subjected to a comprehensive legal analysis. See e.g., Ewen MacAskill,
Russian Troops Removing ID Markings 'Gross Violation', GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/news/defence-and-security-blog/2014/mar/06/ukrainegross-violation-russian-troops [http://perma.cc/XA9B-Q28F] (archived Sept. 20, 2015)
(quoting an analyst who qualifies the deployment of Russian soldiers without identifying markings as a violation of international law); Alberto Riva, Russia's Use Of Unmarked Troops In Simferopol, Crimea: Shady, But Not Illegal, INT'L BUS. TIMES (Mar.
2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/russias-use-unmarked-troops-simferopol-crimea4,
shady-not-illegal-1559425 [http://perma.cc/7HER-HUJ4] (archived Sept. 20, 2015)
(quoting analysts who view the deployment of soldiers without marks as not illegal
under international law); David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Russia's Actions in
Ukraine Clearly Violate the Rules of War, WASH. POST (May 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.comlopinions/russias-actions-in-ukraine-clearly-violate-thegeneva-conventions/2014/05/06/74c8fcde-d22f-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c story.html
[https://perma.cclD4JB-T88T] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (arguing that Russia's military
operations in Ukraine violate the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
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between an international and noninternational armed conflict is
important, because the protection offered by IHL differs depending on
the nature of the conflict.a 0 Next, this Part investigates whether the
use of unmarked troops, taking into account the specific circumstances of the case, constitutes a substantial breach of IHL. Several principles of IHL will be consulted, including the principle of distinction
between civilians and combatants, as well as the rules regarding
military uniforms and emblems and the prohibition of perfidy (as
contrasted to lawful ruses of war). The final Part discusses the pros
and cons of an amendment to the current legal framework in order to
close existing legal gaps and concludes with a recommendation.
A. Applicable IHL for Russia and Ukraine
As the present analysis focuses on the events that took place in
Crimea in late February and early March 2014 concerning the first
appearance of the unmarked soldiers, the crucial question is whether
at this time IHL has (already) become applicable to the situation in
Crimea.3 1
IHL rests on two pillars: first, international treaties, most prominently the Four Geneva Conventions (GC) of 1949 and their Additional Protocols (AP). 32 Treaty rules are only binding on the states

30.
Cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter
GC III] (regarding the treatment of Prisoners of War).
31.
See Remy Jorritsma, Ukraine Insta-Symposium: Certain (Para-)Military
Activities in the Crimea, OPINIO JURIS BLOG (Mar. 9, 2014, 5:56 AM), http:// opiniojuris.org/2014/03/09/ukraine-insta-symposium-certain-para-military-activities-crimealegal-consequences-application-international-humanitarian-law
[http://perma.cc/7JEXLW96] (archived Oct. 11, 2015) (arguing that IHL has become applicable due to a state
of occupation following the complete takeover of Crimea by Russian forces after
authorization by the Russian Federal Council); see also Convention IV respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S.
No. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) ("Territory is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to
the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.").
32.
See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC II]; GC III, supra note 30; Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered
into force Dec. 07, 1978) [hereinafter AP II]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-

2015]

UNMARKED TROOPS IN CRIMEA

1201

that have ratified these treaties. Russia has ratified the major IHL
treaties,38 including the Four Geneva Conventions of 194934 and the

first two Additional Protocols of 197735. Ukraine, too, is a Party to the
Four Geneva Conventions and their first two Additional Protocols. 36
By ratification of these treaties, both states, therefore, are under an
international legal obligation not to violate the rules set forth therein.
Second, both states are bound by customary IHL, which is
formed of a general practice of states who recognize this practice as
law (opinio iuris).3 7 The behavior of states participating in an armed
conflict has always been subject to certain customary rules and principles, based on the practices of armies around the world. Even
though many customary rules of war are today codified in treaties,
customary IHL still remains of crucial importance to fill gaps left by
treaty law. Reference to these customary rules, where applicable, will
be made in the present analysis.
B. Internationalizationof Armed Conflict in Crimea
IHL distinguishes international armed conflicts, which usually,
but not always, refers to an inter-state conflict,3 from armed conflicts
of a noninternational character. Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides for the application of IHL regarding international armed conflicts by stating:
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive
Emblem (Protocol III), Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Jan. 14,
2007) [hereinafter AP III].
33.
See Treaties and State Partiesto Such Treaties, Russian Federation, INT'L
COMMITTEE
OF
THE
RED
CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp-countrySelected=RU
[https://perma.cc/7WBKX5RE] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (reviewing the status of Russia's ratification of IHL
treaties).
34.
GC I-IV, supra note 32 (ratified May 10, 1954).
35.
AP I and II, supra note 32 (ratified Sept. 29, 1989).
36.
GC I-IV, supra note 32 (ratified Aug. 03, 1954); AP I and II, supranote 32
(ratified Jan. 25, 1990).
37.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) ("The
Court ... shall apply ... international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law."). See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (2nd ed.
2005) (commenting on the elements of custom). Cf. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE
DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOL. 1 RULES (2005),

https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-lawi-icrc-eng.pdf [https://perma.ce/3K9M-84EK] (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (providing a
compilation of the customary rules of war).
38.
See AP I, supra note 32, art. 1 1 4 (extending the definition of international
armed conflict to include "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist r~gimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination").
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Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of
a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed re39
sistance.

The ICRC commentary explains:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article
2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no
difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The
respect due to the human person as such is not measured by the number of vic40
tims.

Article 1(4) of AP I expands the scope of an international armed
conflict to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist r6gimes." 41
Noninternational armed conflicts, in contrast, as the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) explains, exist in
situations of "protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within
a State." 42
Article 1(1) of AP II requires for such a conflict that the armed
groups fighting against the government are organized according to a
responsible command structure and that they exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations. Article 3(1) of AP II, however,
excludes conflicts, in which "the government, by all legitimate means,
[takes measures] to maintain or re-establish law and order .

.

. or to

defend the national unity and territorial integrity." 43
The nature of the conflict can change, depending on the factual
situation and the actors involved. This means that a noninternational
armed conflict can become internationalized if a foreign state military
intervenes in the conflict without the consent of the government of
the host state. 44 Until the end of February 2014, the conflict in

GC I-IV, supra note 32, art. 2.
39.
40.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, Volume I 32, 20-21 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952).
AP I, supranote 32, art. 1 1 4.
41.
The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-, I, 1 70 (Oct. 2, 1995); see also
42.
GC I-IV, supra note 32, art. 3.
AP II, supranote 32, art. 1 11, art. 3 T1.
43.
44.
The term "internationalized conflict" is used in legal scholarship to describe internal hostilities that are rendered international by the intervention of a
foreign state. See James Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in
International HumanitarianLaw: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85
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Ukraine was merely an internal one characterized by the clash of
anti-governmental groups, such as pro-Russian separatists and
Ukrainian governmental forces. However, Russian involvement may
have internationalized the conflict.
1. Russian Involvement and Internationalization
In general, the involvement of a foreign state in an internal
armed conflict can transform this conflict into an international one in
two situations: first in cases where a foreign state directly intervenes
into that state without the consent of that state. A direct military
intervention is given, for example, when foreign military forces enter
the territory of the other state4 5 or through bombings of the territory
conducted by the foreign state.4 6
The second scenario in which a conflict becomes internationalized is through indirect involvement of a foreign state, when the
foreign state-without being directly present with its forces on the
territory-substantially supports (logistically, financially or materially) a party to the conflict. 4 7 Accordingly, the ICTY explains in its
Tadic Appeal Judgment that:
[I]n case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a
State, . . . [the conflict] may become international . . . if (i) another State inter-

venes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.4 8

a. Attribution of Nationality to Forces in Crimea
Credible reports of neutral observers indicate that the unmarked
soldiers who appeared in Crimea in February 2014 were in fact Russian special forces. It may be recalled from the facts as described
above that Human Rights Watch identified at least some of these
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 313 (2003) (elaborating on the legal definition of an armed
conflict).
45.

See

ELIZABETH

WILMSHURST,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND

THE

CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 56 (2012) (discussing the effects of foreign intervention
in internal armed conflicts); Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed
Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 581, 607 (Dieter

Fleck ed., 3rd ed. 2013) (arguing that outside control of and support for insurgents will
internationalize the conflict if the intervening state is itself conducting military
operations or controlling operations performed by the armed opposition group).
46.
See, e.g., Sergey Alexeyevich Egorov, The Kosovo Crisis and the Law of
Armed Conflicts, 837 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 183 (2000) (discussing the legality of the
NATO bombings of Kosovo under international law where NATO intervened in the
armed conflicts between the central authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) and the armed separatists of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1999).
47.
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
48.
The Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-, I, ¶¶ 137-40 (Oct. 2, 1995).
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units as Russian personnel and, moreover, observed that those men
used "Russian military vehicles and other equipment that Ukrainian
forces are not known to have." 49 In addition, some of those unmarked
50
men even admitted to western journalists that they were Russians.
It should also be recalled that after denying the affiliation of these
troops in the first place, President Putin later admitted on Russian
51
These facts provide
television that those troops were Russians.
belonged to the
troops
the
unmarked
that
to
conclude
strong evidence
forces.
Russian military
The armed forces of a state are attributable to that state by
default. 52 It is a long-standing rule of customary international law,
codified in Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) that a state is
responsible for "all acts committed by persons forming part of its
armed forces." 53 This is also confirmed by Article 4 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 54 declaring that the conduct of any organ
(i.e., "any person or entity which has that status in accordance with
the internal law of the State") is attributable to that state, no matter
which function it exercises or which position or status it holds in the
55
organization of the state.
b. State Sponsorship and Attribution of Conduct of Forces
Irrespective of the nationality of the soldiers involved, the Crimean conflict can become internationalized if it can be proven that
Russia has substantially sponsored these troops.
In situations where a foreign state indirectly intervenes by
sponsoring a party to the conflict, it is problematic whether and to
what extent this support is sufficient to internationalize the conflict.
This controversial legal issue has been dealt with in Nicaragua v.
United States, in which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was
asked to determine the responsibility of the United States for an
armed conflict between a Nicaraguan rebel group it had sponsored

HuM. RTs. WATCH, Q&A Russia, Ukraine,supra note 6.
49.
See Lipman, supra note 12.
50.
See Putin Says No Russian Troops in East Ukraine, AL JAZEERA.COM (April
51.
17, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/04/putin-says-no-russian-troops6
east-ukraine-201441713243680 530.html [http://perma.cc/NA6B-6Y8N] (archived Sept.
24, 2015) (dismissing as "nonsense" any claims that Russian special forces were
causing unrest in Ukraine).
See Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 40, at 530 § 149.
52.
Id.
53.
See The Draft Articles on State Responsibility, G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 3 (Dec.
54.
12, 2001) (adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001 and recommended by the UN GA for adoption by the states); Int'l Law Comm'n, Commentary,
Commentaries to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Report of the Int'l Law
Comm'n on the work of its Fifty-third session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, 1 59 (2001).
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 4.
55.
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through providing weapons, financial assistance, military training,
and the publication and dissemination of a manual on "Psychological
Operations in Guerrilla Warfare," in which certain acts of warfare
were advised.56 The ICJ treated the conflict as a noninternational one
and consequently applied common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (the obligation to "respect" and to "ensure respect" for Conventions) to measure U.S. conduct.57 While the lCJ held that the United
States had breached its obligation by supporting and further encouraging the rebels in their conduct, 58 it also stated that the United
States could not be held responsible for the conduct of the rebel group
by means of attribution because the United States did not exercise
"effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the
course of which the alleged violations were committed." 59 Since the
lCJ merely addressed the issue of state responsibility and did not
further elaborate on the requirements that have to be met to find that
the conflict has become internationalized, the value of the Nicaragua
case for determining the nature of an armed conflict needs to be put
into question. 60
Thus, the standard adopted by the ICTY in the Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic case serves better to determine whether and to what
extent the indirect intervention of a foreign state in an internal
conflict is sufficient to internationalize the conflict. 61 The ICTY applied the logic that if the conduct was attributable to a foreign state,
then the armed conflict was to be regarded as an international one.
The ICTY argued that in order to attribute the conduct of a wellorganized paramilitary or military group to the foreign state it is

56.
See, e.g., Anthony Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in
International Humanitarian Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 189 (2004)
(discussing the Nicaragua case); Davis B. Tyner, Internationalizationof War Crimes
Prosecutions:Correcting the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's Folly in Tadic, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 843 (2006).
57.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 1 215-20 (June 27).
58.
See id. at §§ 215-220, 254-56.
59.
See id. at §§ 109, 115 (demonstrating that the ICJ has reaffirmed the
effective control test in the context of the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina);
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb., Judgment (2007)) I.C.J. Rep. 595, §§ 398-99, 406
(Feb. 26) (explaining that effective control is needed to attribute conduct of non-state
organs to a state and that the overall control test risks of unjustly broadening the
responsibility of a state).
60.
See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in
Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EURO. J. INT'L L. 649, 663 (2007)
(arguing that the Nicaragua Test and the Tadic Test are not mutually exclusive, but
apply to different situations); Theodor Meron, Classificationof Armed Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua'sFallout, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236, 241 (1998) (arguing
that the Nicaragua Test is applicable to the imputability of private acts for establishing
state responsibility).
61.
See Cassese, supra note 60, at 663.
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sufficient to show that the state exercised "overall control" over the
fighters. 62 In contrast, as to single individuals and unorganized
groups, the ICTY retained the standard set forth by the ICJ in the
Nicaraguacase. 63
The Tadic test applied to the situation in Crimea requires a
showing that Russia, in addition to financing, training, equipping, or
providing operational support to the insurgents, must have played a
substantial role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military
actions of the insurgents and thus exercised overall control.
It can be inferred from the reported facts, as described above,
that Russia had gained substantial control over key strategic facilities in Crimea. Russia obtained a military naval station in Sevastopol
under the Black Sea Treaty with-as of 2013-about 13,000 Russian
naval personnel being stationed there.6 4 According to reports, the
number of the naval personnel was increased in late February or
early March 2014.65 Having such a large number of military personnel stationed in Crimea provided a demonstrative signal that Russia
would be prepared to step in if necessary and thus created a potential
threat and warning to Ukraine's governmental forces. Moreover,
reports by independent sources suggest that Russia also actively
supported and sponsored the rebels and the unmarked soldiers.
Human Rights Watch credibly reported that these troops used Russian military vehicles and other equipment that Ukrainian forces are
not known to have.66 Therefore, it can be assumed that Russia has
been involved in equipping and training these forces, even though the
full extent of such support cannot be disclosed with certainty. It is
doubtful whether the Ukrainian rebel troops would have been able to
gain control over Crimea and fight against Ukrainian military forces
without the support, or at least consent, of Russia.
The unmarked troops, irrespective of their nationality, can be at
least materially linked to Russia through their ethnic Russian origin
and motives as well as through Russia's corresponding (strategic and
political) interests in Crimea. At least a large part of the rebels were
pro-Russian, and they were demanding either a complete separation
of Crimea from Ukraine or at least a continued close relationship to

See id. at 665.
62.
See Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defense Motion
63.
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, § 98 (Appeals Chamber July 15, 1999).
Questions and Answers: Russia, Ukraine, and InternationalHumanitarian
64.
and Human Rights Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (March 22, 2014) [hereinafter Questions and Answers], http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/21/questions-and-answersrussia-ukraine-and-international-humanitarian-and-human-righ-0
[http://perma.cc/C7SG-VWSH] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).
See id.
65.
See id.
66.
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Russia.6 7 Russia for its part has never denied its sympathy with the
motives of the rebels. On the contrary, on many occasions Russia has
welcomed them. 68 Putin has even claimed to be entitled to humanitarian intervention to protect the ethnic Russians in Crimea.69 Moreover, Russia has a key interest in Crimean territory as its major
Black Sea Fleet Base. These factors taken in combination establish a
special responsibility of Russia with regard to the events in Crimea.
Lastly, Article 1(4) of AP I, which established that armed conflicts in
which people are fighting against racist regimes are to be considered
international conflicts, can be held against Russia. Russia itself has
raised the allegation that the Crimean people were oppressed by the
Ukrainian regime and, thus, were fighting against this regime. Taking all this together, it must be concluded that Russia's role in Crimea has internationalized the conflict. 70
2. Criteria for Finding of Armed Conflict
Not all conflicts qualify as "armed conflicts" under IHL. 71 Even
though this term is not further defined in IHL treaties, it is applied in
a broad sense, as suggested by the official commentary to common
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. 72
The Commentary suggests that a low threshold should apply by
drawing attention to the fact that in the draft to common Article 2 the
term "war" was substituted for "armed conflict" in order to ensure

67.
See Harriet Salem, Shaun Walker & Oksana Grytsenko, Russia Puts
Military on High Alert as Crimea Protests Leave One Man Dead, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/26/ukraine-new-leader-disbandsriot-police-crimea-separatism [http://perma.cc/92M5-NQKN] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).
68.
See Transcript: Putin Defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, WASH.
PosT (March 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defendsrussian-intervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcdla-a3a9-1le3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c sto
ry.html [http://perma.cclM36B-7HUP] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).
69.
See id. (quoting Putin as saying, "We retain the to use all available means
to protect those people. We believe this would be absolutely legitimate.").
70.
Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27) (demonstrating that this does not
mean that Russia is per se legally responsible for the conduct of the rebels). In this
regard it must be proven that Russia exercised effective control over the rebels in order
to attribute the conduct to Russia. The strict standards of the effective control test
essentially require that the armed units are operating on the instruction, or at the
direction, of Russia. Whether specific instructions were given is doubtful and remains a
matter of speculations. For the present analysis there is no need to further elaborate on
this issue on the effective control test.
71.
See GC I-IV, supra note 32, art. 2 (explaining that the conventions apply
in "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them").
72.
See I 32 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952).
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that states do not attempt to deny the applicability of IHL by claim73
ing that they are engaged only in a police action rather than a war.
Similarly, the ICTY has also adopted a broad definition and has noted
that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
74
force between States."
Note that "armed conflict" must not be confused with the term
"armed attack" under the self-defense right of Article 51 in the UN
Charter, for which a higher threshold applies requiring certain "scale
and effects." It also excludes minor armed incidents, such as mere
frontier incidents, from its ambit. 75 In contrast, the existence of an
armed conflict between two states under IHL can be assumed when76
ever parts of the armed forces of two states clash with each other.
Only low level encounters, such as "border incidents" or "skirmishes,"
77
do not trigger the application of IHL. A broad interpretation of
armed conflict is also in line with the aim and purpose of the rules of
war, which serve humanitarian purposes. Persons who have fallen
into the hands of enemies should enjoy the protections offered by
IHL, regardless of the level of intensity of the conflict.
Applying these principles to the present case, it can be concluded
that even without any actual fighting an armed conflict between
78
Russia and Ukraine exists. The fact that warning shots were fired
and that armed force was employed against Ukrainian soldiers,
79
preventing them from leaving their bases, qualifies this situation as
an armed conflict within the broad meaning of IHL.
3. Intervention by Invitation
Russia has claimed a right of intervention by invitation in Crimea based upon the request of the Prime Minister of Crimea and the
80
former Ukrainian President Yanukovich.

Id.
73.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Inter74.
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction § 70 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 2, 1995).
Cf. ROBERT KOLB, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS § 48
75.
(2009) (listing examples of an armed attack).
See Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to
76.
the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 117, 128-132 (1979)
(describing the different types of armed conflicts).
See Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in InternationalLaw,
77.
http://www.ila-hq.org/ downInt'l Law Ass'n Use of Force Comm., 29-32 (2010),
9 87
6 7
load.cfm/docid/2176DC63-D268-4133-8989A6 4 54F F . [http://perma.cclJ6YS-2FG8]
(archived Sept. 20, 2015).
Warning Shots End OSCE Crimea Entry Bid, AL JAZEERA (March 8, 2014),
78.
2
http://www.aljazeera.comnews/europe/ 014/03/warning-shots-end-osce-crimea-entrybid-20143815135639790.html [http://perma.cc/QF8D-36GG] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).
Questions and Answers, supra note 64, at 3-4.
79.
See Lally, Englund & Booth, supra note 15 (reporting that Russia had
80.
stated in a Security Council meeting that the Prime Minister of Crimea and the former
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Under general international law, an intervention by a foreign
state is not considered illegal if the host state has consented to it.81 In
the context of IHL, this means that an international armed conflict
does not exist in situations where the host state allows another state
to carry out armed activities on its territory.82
However, neither the request by the Prime Minister of Crimea
nor the request by the former Ukrainian President addressed to
Russia for military intervention in Crimea qualifies as valid consent
to an intervention. First, under the principle of nonintervention in
international law, only the central government, not the government
of a province, can lawfully allow another state to carry out military
activities on its territory. 83 The consent has to be given by the actual
government that exercises effective control. In this regard, it has to
be noted that the legality of Yanukovich's removal from office and the
installment of a new government under Ukrainian law are both
irrelevant for determining if a valid consent has been given under
international law.84 International law, in principal, is blind towards
domestic law.85 Since international law is concerned with notions of
stability, durability, and effectiveness, as a matter of international
law, the existence of a de facto government, displaying at least a

Ukrainan President Yanukovich had asked for Russian military assistance in
Ukraine); see also Carol Kriel & Vladimir Isachenkov, AP Interview: Yanukovych
Admits Mistakes on Crimea, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 2, 2014), http:/ bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-yanukovych-crimea-part-ukraine
[http://perma.cc/
BWF8-97QW] (archived Sept. 20, 2015).
81.
See Georg Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed. 2010), http://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/1aw-9780199231690-e1702?rskey=UZxXqA&resu
lt=2&prd=EPIL [http://perma.cclBL2S-PQB9 (archived Sept. 20, 2015) (describing
intervention by invitation).
82.
See Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN Law 101 § 8-9 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2013).
83.
See Nolte, supra note 81, §12 (explaining that state practice following the
Cold War interventions by the Soviet Union and the United States indicate that
demonstrable consent by the highest available governmental authority is required in
order to identify attempts of abuse); cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, § 246 (June 27) ("[Ilt
is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government
of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition.").
84.
Cf. Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis-An InternationalLaw Perspective,

74

ZEITSCHRIFT

AUSLANDISCHES

OFFENTLICHES

RECHT

UND

VOLKERRECHT

(HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 367, 367-91) (2014) (discussing the legality of the removal of
Yanukovich from the office).
85.
In extreme cases, state practice since the end of the Cold War suggests
that the democratic legitimacy of a government has been occasionally taken into
account when determining the legality of an invitation to intervene. For example, the
case of the Apartheid government in South Africa demonstrates that modern international law requires a government to possess minimal internal legitimacy. Cf. Nolte,
supra note 81, §§ 17, 22 (discussing the legality of interventions by invitations).
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minimum of effectiveness, is regarded as sufficient.86 Since Yanukovich, after having fled the country, had lost all internal power and
support, his government was no longer effective. Since the interim
government did not consent to Russia's military intervention,8 7 Russia's actions are not justified on the grounds of a valid intervention by
invitation and, consequently, do not hinder the application of the law
of international armed conflicts.

IV. UNMARKED ARMED FORCES UNDER IHL

In the following Part, several norms of the law of war will be
consulted to find whether the use of unmarked soldiers in Crimea
under the circumstances of this particular case constitutes a violation
of IHL. The principles that will be consulted are (1) the principle of
distinction between combatants and civilians, (2) the rules regarding
military uniforms, (3) the prohibition of perfidy, and (4) the rules
concerning ruses of war. It will be shown that these rules are not free
from ambiguity, thus leaving a broad spectrum for interpretation.
A. Principle of Distinction
The principle of distinction, which is part of international treaty
and customary law, applies in both international and noninternational armed conflicts.88 The International Committee of the Red Cross
has formulated the content of this principle as requiring that "[the]
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians
and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants.
89
Attacks must not be directed against civilians."
First expressions of this principle can be found in the preamble
of the St. Petersburg Declaration ("the only legitimate object which
States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the

See id. § 18 ("[T]his minimum is normally present in cases of internal
86.
conflict as long as a government that is challenged by rebellion has not lost control of a
sufficiently representative part of the State territory.").
See Smale & Erlanger, supra note 9 (reporting that the Ukrainian interim
87.
Prime Minister declared the presence of Russian troops as unacceptable and as a
"provocation").
See UN GA Res. 2444 (XXIII), 2675 (XXV); GC I-IV, supra note 32, art. 3;
88.
AP II, supra note 32, art.13(2); International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Declaration on the Rules of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Governingthe Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 278 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 387, 387-88
(1990); St. Petersburg Declaration, Dec. 11, 1868 (demonstrating that the International
Institute of Humanitarian Law has identified the basis of this rule for noninternational armed conflicts in the St. Petersburg Declaration).
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supranote 37, at 3 (Rule 1).
89.
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military forces of the enemy")90 and in Article 22 of the Lieber Code of
1863 ("as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has
likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction
between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the
hostile country itself, with its men in arms"). 91 It has also found entry
in several international treaties, such as Article 48 of AP I to the
Geneva Conventions ("the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
92
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants").
National Military Manuals equally set forth the distinction of the
civilian population and combatants. 93 States, international bodies,
and scholarly literature have equally stressed the fundamental value
of this principle as one of the most important accomplishments and
94
leading principles of IHL since the nineteenth century.
A closer examination of the principle of distinction reveals that it
consists of two components. First, it imposes an obligation on the
parties to the conflict to ensure that individuals actively participating
in the hostilities (the combatants) are distinguishable from persons
not taking part in the hostilities (the civilians). The distinction between these two categories has to be maintained at all times during
the armed conflict.95 Second, the principle of distinction requires that
all parties refrain from attacking civilians.
Only combatants are lawful targets of attacks. 96 Both components are intrinsically linked with each other in the sense that the
obligation from one component is enforced and protected by the obligation flowing from the other one. The bottom line of this principle is
the ideal that the hostilities should only take place between certain

Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
90.
Under 400 Grammes Weight (adopted Nov. 29, 1868) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1868),
reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPp. 95, 96 (1907).
Lieber Code, supranote 26.
91.
See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 37, at 4 n.3 (noting that
92.
this rule has been adopted by consensus and provides evidence to its acceptance as
customary international law).
See id. at 3-25 (citing examples from domestic law).
93.
94.
See id. at 3-25 (providing examples of state practice and opinio juris);
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Opinion, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, at 1 78 (July 8) (noting that the ICJ confirmed the cardinal importance
of this principle in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion); see also Knut Ipsen, Combatants
and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 65,

79 (Fleck ed. 2013) (highlighting the crucial importance of the principle of distinction
for IHL); Nils Melzer, The Principleof Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 296, 296-331

(Clapham et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that the principle of distinction is the most important IHL principle).
E.g. Ipsen, supra note 94; Melzer, supra note 94 (focusing on the second
95.
component of this principle concerning the legitimate target of the attack.).
96.
See GARY D. SOLIS, THE
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 188 (2010).
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groups of persons; attacker and target should ideally be combatants
only.9 7
The Crimean case triggers the first aspect of this principle: the
conflict parties' obligation to ensure that their combatants are distinguishable from the civilian population. Since the soldiers were uniformed and therefore clearly distinguishable from the civilian population, the principle of distinction in its traditional sense, as laid down
above, is not violated.
The principle of distinction additionally requires that combatants must wear nationality emblems or other insignia that make
them clearly attributable to a specific party to a conflict. Therefore, a
deeper inquiry into the contents of this principle by means of interpretation 98 has to be made.
An interpretation of the principle of distinction (as set forth in
Article 48 of AP I),9 9 in accordance with its common meaning and its
systematic context within IHL, strongly suggests that a distinction
has to be made between combatants and civilians in the sense that
these two groups should be distinguishable from each other.
However, none of the IHL treaties further define the terms
combatant or civilian but instead confine themselves to regulating
only certain characteristics and consequences of the combatant status. 100 For instance, Article 4(A)(1) of GC III merely declares that
"[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces" are prisoners of war. 101 According to Article 43(2) of AP I,
"(m)embers of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants." 102 It is noticeable that Article 43(1) of AP I adopts a broad
concept of the term armed forces as including "all organized armed

97.
If the attacker is a civilian, he is not entitled to POW status. Likewise, the
attack of civilian persons or objects has consequences for determining a breach of IHL
by the state party as well as for personal criminal responsibility. Cf. EVE LA HAYE,
WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 104-21 (2008) (discussing the differences
between combatants and civilians under IHL).
98.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]
(showing that these rules include the wording/ordinary meaning, the systematic
context within the treaty and within international law, the object and purpose of the
treaty, and the subsequent practice of the states parties as a primary means of interpretation along with the historical context as supplementary means of interpretation).
99.
AP I-II, supra note 32, art. 48 (ratified by Russia in 1989).
100.
See GC I-IV, supra note 32, art. 3 (demonstrating that only combatants
have a right to directly participate in hostilities; they may be attacked, until they
surrender or are otherwise hors de combat; and once they fall into the power of the
enemy, they become prisoners of war (POWs) and enjoy certain privileges).
101.
See generally Marco Sass6li, Combatants, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81 (discussing the legal status of combatants and POW).
102.
Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 43(2).
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forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to
that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an
adverse Party." 0 3
It follows from these provisions that the status of being a combatant relies on merely objective criteria, namely the (factual) belonging of an individual to a certain group (such as the armed forces),
which in turn belongs to a party to the conflict.1 04 Despite this objective definition, by linking the combatant to a state party, neither
treaty nor customary law provides for a legal obligation to disclose
the nationality of the combatants (for example, by wearing nationality emblems) vis-A-vis the adverse party. The reason for this is found
in the common understanding that the primary aim and purpose of
the principle of distinction is to increase protection of the civilian
population against the effects of war by sparing them from being
targets of the hostilities.105 Furthermore, it can be inferred from the
provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners of wars as codified in
GC III that the principle of distinction also aims to protect combatants by assuring them certain guarantees of treatment when fallen in
the hands of enemies.
Besides these humanitarian purposes, nothing in IHL suggests
that the principle of distinction is also aimed at serving state interests (e.g., by guaranteeing that combatants should clearly be linked to
a specific party to the conflict). The belonging of a combatant to a
state party, therefore, is not a legal requirement, but merely a factual
one-a description of factual conditions leading to the legal qualification as a combatant.
In conclusion, the principle of distinction does not prohibit the
use of unmarked soldiers in an armed conflict. The principle of distinction serves only humanitarian needs, but not state interests to
identify a specific enemy. State interests are rather protected by
another principle of IHL, the prohibition of perfidy, which will be
analyzed further below in more detail. 0 6
B. Customary InternationalLaw on Emblems and Uniforms
Since the principle of distinction is indifferent towards the disclosure of the combatant's nationality, it is necessary to look further

103.
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 37, at 11, 14 (noting that this
broad definition of armed forces and combatants corresponds to customary international law).
104.
See Sass6li, supra note 101.
105.
See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 57(1) ("In the conduct of military
operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and
civilian objects.").
106.
See id. art. 37.
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into the customary rules governing the use of uniforms to find whether a general rule regarding the appearance of military uniforms has
crystallized.
While the wearing by national armies of distinctive military
clothes has a long tradition, the functions and purposes of these
clothes have changed over time. 107 In ancient times, uniforms served
mainly the purpose of maintaining the solidarity of the fighting
group.108 Today, these traditional functions are overlapped and replaced by a variety of functional, practical, and legal purposes. Functionally, wearing a uniform serves the purposes of identification,
maintaining discipline, and creating bonds (an esprit de corps) among
the soldiers. 109 It is mainly military considerations (such as flexibility
and visibility vis-A-vis friendly combatants) that determine a uniform's appearance. 110
In addition to these functional considerations, modern IHL has
further attached legal functions to a military uniform. Most importantly, a uniform serves to ensure that the principle of distinction
between combatants and civilians is observed.111 Many national
military codes acknowledge this legal function and, accordingly,
prescribe that soldiers must wear a distinctive sign to make them
distinguishable from the civilian population. 112 Most domestic military manuals require members of the regular armed forces to wear a
complete military uniform, whereas it suffices for irregular forces to
only wear a "distinctive sign." 113
This domestic practice is not reflected by IHL. IHL neither
requires that armed forces wear a complete military uniform nor
dictates what a uniform is to comprise. 114 For example, Article
4(A)(2)b of GC III only specifies that, in order to gain prisoner of war
(POW) status, members of other militias and volunteer corps, includ-

107.
RED CROSS
108.
109.

See Toni Pfanner, Military Uniforms and the Law of War, 86 INT'L REV.
93, 95, 98 (2004) (discussing the evolution of military uniforms).
See id. at 95 (discussing the importance of uniforms to ancient armies).
See id. at 99; Dale Stephens & Tristan Skousgaard, Flags and Uniforms in

War, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81.

110.
See Pfanner, supra note 107, at 100 ("Uniforms worn on the battlefield are
mainly designed to meet combat requirements.").
111.
See id. at 104 ("[T]hat a clear distinction must be made between combatants and civilians was obviously in tune with the requirement of wearing a military
uniform.").
112.
See id. at 103; see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 37, at
3-25 (providing examples from domestic military codes).
113.
See Pfanner, supra note 107, at 103; see also W. Hays Parks, Special Forces
Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 493, 544 (2003) (contending that a
fixed distinctive sign requirement may be met with the wearing of a particular hat,
scarf, or armband, or the affixing of a national flag emblem on a part of the clothing).
114.
See Stephens & Skousgaard, supra note 109, $$ 4, 5; Parks, supra note
113, at 544 (discussing this issue in connection with the conduct of special forces in
covert operations).
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ing organized resistance movements, must, inter alia, wear a fixed
distinctive sign. Similarly, Article 1(2) of the Hague Regulations uses
the term "fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance." 115 As
to the appearance of regular armed forces, however, IHL remains
silent. Nevertheless, it follows a majore ad minus that the obligation
to wear at least distinctive sign applies to members of armed forces
too.1 16 Beyond this point, IHL leaves to domestic law the determination of the concrete appearance of the military clothes." 7
Not surprisingly, nationality emblems are mentioned only incidentally in Article 18 of GC III by stating that "[b]adges of rank and
nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or
sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war."118 This
provision prescribes only the effects of imprisonment and the rights of
the POW. By setting out rules regarding the property of the POW,
this provision serves individual interests. It does not, however, place
a legal obligation on combatants to wear signs of nationality.
In conclusion, the lack of nationality insignia on the uniforms of
the unmarked soldiers in Crimea violates neither the principle of
distinction in general nor the rules concerning military uniforms
specifically. This is because IHL does not serve state interests but is
primarily concerned with humanitarian aspects, requiring (only) that
fighters are distinguishable from the civilian population.
C. Standardsfor Perfidy
The use of unmarked soldiers may be illegal under IHL as it
could amount to prohibited perfidy.
It must be borne in mind that since time immemorial it has been
part of military art to induce the enemy to fall into traps in order to
gain a military advantage. Such acts are only prohibited under IHL
when they include a breach of faith of the adversary. Such illegal acts
of deception are qualified as perfidy under IHL. The first sentence of
Article 37(1) of AP I reflects customary international law' 19 and spells
out the prohibition of perfidy: "It is prohibited to kill, injure or cap-

See Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 31, annex, art. 1(2) (defining
115.
"fixed" to mean that it must not be taken off too easily and "recognizable" to mean
pertaining to the ability of combatants to recognize a civilian at a distance at which
weapons could be used to target such persons); Pfanner, supra note 107, at 107, 108.
116.
But see Ipsen, supra note 94 (arguing that there is an obligation under
Article 44 (7) AP I as well as under the corresponding customary rule for regular armed
forces to wear the uniform of their state when directly involved in the hostilities).
117.
See Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 44(7) ("This Article is not intended to
change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of the
uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to
the conflict.").
118.
GC III, supra note 32, art. 18.
119.
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 37, at 221-227.
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ture an adversary by resort to perfidy." 120 The second sentence of this
article then goes on to define perfidy as "[a]cts inviting the confidence
of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is
obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." 12 1
The second sentence of Article 37(3) provides for a nonexhaustive
list of examples of perfidy, which are:
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and
(d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of
12 2
the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.

Article 38 of AP I, also reflecting customary international law,128
lists certain acts akin to perfidy, such the improper use of the distinctive emblem of certain recognized organizations including the Red
Cross, the Red Crescent, and the United Nations, as well as other
recognized emblems, such as the flag of truce and the emblem of
cultural property.
Article 39 of AP I codifies customary rules on nationality emblems and provides in the first and second paragraphs:
It is prohibited to make use in an armed conflict of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict
S. ...It is prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or
uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations. ...124

Similar provisions regarding perfidy can be found in other treaties. 125
In the case of Crimea, none of the above expressly listed examples of perfidy are triggered. Especially, the unmarked soldiers in
Crimea did not use false emblems or insignia; they did not wear
nationality insignia at all.

Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 37(1).
120.
121.
Id.
Id. art. 37(3).
122.
123.
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 37, at 530.
Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 39.
124.
See Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 31, annex, art. 23(b), (f) (forbid125.
ding soldiers "to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation
or army . .. [and] to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or the
military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as distinctive badges of the Geneva
Convention [of 1864].").
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Nonetheless, perfidy may also exist in situations that are not
expressly listed in AP I. The crucial question, therefore, is: Does the
use of unmarked soldiers under the given situation in Crimea nevertheless constitute prohibited perfidy under IHL?
Special attention must be first drawn to the complexity of the
situation in Crimea in late February and early March 2014 with
different actors with different motivations and goals being involved:
the armed forces of Ukraine, the pro-Russian Ukrainian rebels, and
the Russian naval personal stationed in the Black See Fleet Base.
The appearance of the unmarked troops blurred this situation even
more as it was unclear which party these troops belonged to.
As discussed above, strong evidence suggests that the unmarked
soldiers were Russian forces. 126 By covertly deploying these unmarked troops in Crimea, Russia attempted to evade attribution of
these forces, thus hiding the international character of the conflict by
making it appear entirely internal. Russia, therefore, deceived the
Ukrainian government about the nationality of these forces. Without
any doubt, Russia's involvement had a substantial influence on the
events and eventually contributed to the later secession of Crimea
from Ukraine. But does this amount to prohibited perfidy under IHL?
Illegal perfidy has to be distinguished from lawful ruses of war.
The latter are defined in Article 24 of the Hague Regulations of
1899/1907, which reflects customary law: "Ruses of war and the
employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about
the enemy are considered permissible." 127
Ruses of war are also warranted in Article 37(2) of AP I, which
states:
Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule
of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious
because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to pro128
tection under that law.

Articles 37(2) of AP I gives four examples of ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and misinformation.
Both perfidy and ruses contain elements of deception. 129 A distinction between these two forms of conduct can be based on different
criteria.

126.
See HUM. RTS. WATCH, Q&A Russia, Ukraine, supranote 6; see also supra
Part III.B.1.a.
127.
Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 31, annex, art. 24.
128.
Protocol I, supranote 32, art. 37(2).
129.
See, e.g., Vera Rusinova, Perfidy, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81; Knut Ipsen, Ruses of War, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 81.
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First, it can rely on objective criteria (regarding the object of the
deception). Some scholars see the crucial element of a ruse of war as
deceiving the enemy on a point of fact (e.g., on the strength of the
army) with the aim of gaining a military advantage. Perfidy, on the
other hand, deceives about a point of law, specifically on the applicability of a protection under IHL.1 30
Second, subjective elements (taking into account the intention of
the deceiver and the effect on the adversary) can also serve as a
distinctive criteria. Whereas perfidy is based on a betrayal of the
adversary's confidence and trust, ruses of war intend to (merely)
mislead the enemy and to induce him to react in ways detrimental to
his interests.1 31 The underlying rationale of the prohibition of perfidy
is that one party should not gain a military advantage from the
breach of the adversary's good faith by his mistaken belief regarding
32
the existence of a situation giving rise to protection under IHL.1
That is why, for example, IHL prohibits simulating surrender by
hoisting a white flag, since this gesture grants protection from attack
under IHL that otherwise would not exist.
Article 37(2) of AP I combines both objective and subjective
criteria and sets out three cumulative elements of perfidy: "(i) the
existence of a norm of international law granting in certain circumstances protection (which the enemy is entitled to or is obligated to
accord); (ii) inducing the enemy to trust that such circumstances have
33
arisen; and (iii) an intent to breach that trust."1
The International Committee of the Red Cross provides exam34
ples of permitted ruses of wars, which do not amount to perfidy.1
Most interestingly, it considers "removing the signs indicating rank,
unit, nationality or special function from uniforms" as lawful. Similarly, Switzerland's Basic Military Manual also considers this conduct
as a lawful ruse of war. 135 Indeed, this practice has been frequently
used by states in armed conflicts and is not considered illegal under
IHL. For example, during the Operation Southern Watch (1992-

See, e.g., ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
130.
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 164 (2008) (listing the Trojan Horse as a
ruse of war).
See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITES UNDER THE LAW OF
131.
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 199 (2004).

132.
133.
134.

See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 130, at 161.
Protocol I, supra note 31, art. 37(2).
See Claude Pilloud & Jean Pictet, Prohibitionon Perfidy, in COMMENTARY

ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 To THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12

AUGUST 1949 429, 443-44 (Pilloud et al. ed. 1987).
135.
See INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Customary IHL Database,
[https://perma.cclL3YNhttps://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2 rulrule57
VFYC ] (archived Nov. 14, 2015) (citing SWITZERLAND, BASIC MILITARY MANUAL, art. 8
(1987) and UNITED KINGDOM, MILITARY MANUAL, § 312 (1958)).
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2003),136 U.S. pilots enforcing a no-fly zone in Iraq routinely removed
all identifying markings from their uniforms in order to deny their
enemies any intelligence information in the event that the pilots were
captured. 137 Moreover, camouflage (defined as the disguising of military personnel, equipment, and installations by painting or covering
them to make them blend in with their surroundings13 8 ) is considered
lawful in land warfare, even if nationality signs are concealed. 139
Nevertheless, depending on the specific circumstances of the
case, each situation has to be individually analyzed to establish
whether a certain conduct constitutes a lawful ruse or illegal perfidy. 140 In the Crimean Case, the concealing of the unmarked soldiers'
true identity is certainly aimed to betray the confidence of Ukraine by
making them falsely believe that Russia is not involved in the conflict
in order to create an unstable situation and eventually to prepare for
the annexation of Crimea into Russian territory. Therefore, the subjective element of perfidy is fulfilled.
The objective element of perfidy, however, is not fulfilled. Russia's attempt to make Ukraine believe that the unmarked soldiers are
Ukrainian self-defense forces instead of Russian soldiers concerns a
factual situation. Therefore, the deceit took place on a point of fact
(nationality of the soldiers) and not, as required by perfidy, on a point
of law (the protection under IHL). 14 1
The Crimean Case compared to the examples above is insofar
special, since the former cases involve a conduct within an armed
conflict where the parties are-at least in general-known to each

136.
See Fact Sheet: Operation Southern Watch, U.S. Air Force Historical
Support
Division
(Sept.
18,
2012),
http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/factsheets/
factsheet.asp?id=19816 [http://perma.cc/8APG-28AU] (archived Oct. 13, 2015) (providing background information on this military operation).
137.
See Ryan Faith, The Russian Soldier Captured in Crimea May Not Be
Russian, a Soldier, or Captured, VICE NEWS (Mar. 10, 2014, 11:20 AM), https://news.
vice.com/article/the-russian-soldier-captured-in-crimea-may-not-be-russian-a-soldieror-captured [https://perma.cclEJ6F-JW93] (archived Oct. 13, 2015).
138.

FROM BONBON TO CHA-CHA: OXFORD DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN WORDS AND

PHRASES 50 (Andrew Delahunty ed. 2008).
139.
E.g. British national fighting in Syria in camouflage. But, in air warfare,
signs of nationality should still remain visible on the aircraft. See U.S. AIR FORCE
PAMPHLET, §§ 8-3(b), 8-4(a) & (b), 7-4 (1976) ("The camouflage of a flying aircraft must
not conceal national markings of the aircraft . . . Military aircraft . . . are . .. required

to be marked with appropriate signs of their nationality.").
140.
For example, Sweden's IHL Manual acknowledges border line situations in
stating that "in certain circumstances, ruses of war may become almost tantamount to
perfidy." Sweden, IHL Manual § 3.2.1.1(b) 30 (1991).
141.
A typical example of deceit on a point of law, in contrast, is the misuse of a
white flag by a combatant to feign surrender while using the situation to commit a
deceitful attack on the enemy. The white flag signals surrender and gives rise to
protection under IHL by the prohibition to military attack the carrier. In the Crimean
Case at hand, however, the deceit about the true nationality of the soldiers does not
trigger any legal protection under IHL.
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other. In contrast, Ukraine does not have knowledge about the involvement of Russia as a party to the conflict. Russia's conduct specif142
ically aims at denying military involvement in the conflict at all.
Whether knowledge about all the parties participating in the conflict
is a crucial element of a lawful ruse of war as distinguished from
perfidy, however, is more than doubtful. As such, it does not justify a
difference in legal judgment concerning the use of a ruse of war in a
conflict where the parties are known to each other and in a situation
where one party deceives the other regarding its involvement. Thus,
the Crimean Case provides a challenge for IHL.
Certainly, from a moral standpoint, Russia's conduct is reprehensible. From a legal perspective, however, this is not so clear-cut.
While the soldiers' nationality crucially determines the category of
armed conflict as either a noninternational or an international one,
this qualification, however, does not alter any legally protected interests of Ukraine-neither with respect to Russia nor with respect to
the unmarked soldiers. Indeed, the qualification of the conflict here
has relevance only with regard to the POW status for captured combatants. 143 But the rules on POWs only aim to protect the rights and
interests of the combatants (and indirectly those of the party of the
conflict to whom these POWs belong). They do not protect the interests of the state who has captured them. In conclusion, the deceit
about the nationality of the soldiers cannot be regarded as a betrayal
of any legally protected interests of Ukraine. Absent any indicative
state practice and clear treaty law, Russia's use of unmarked soldiers
does not amount to illegal perfidy and has to be considered as a
lawful ruse under IHL.

V. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the Crimean conflict, which was
until February 2014 an internal one, became internationalized
through the presence and activities of Russian forces on Ukrainian
territory as well as through the attributed actions of the unmarked
soldiers to Russia.
The legal analysis has also shown that-even though it lost a
great deal of its reputation and credibility, both being of high value in
international affairs-Russia's use of unmarked soldiers in Crimea
does not violate IHL. Russia expertly made use of a gray area and gap
of IHL by using unmarked soldiers to seize control over key infrastructure and to prepare for the annexation of Crimea.

142.
143.

See Rivkin & Casey, supranote 29 (pointing out a violation of IHL).
In an internal conflict, captured soldiers are not protected as POW.
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Should the international community close this legal gap by
amending IHL to prohibit the use of unmarked troops in similar cases
in the future? In fact, it is likely that similar strategies will be employed in other conflicts. The current gap in IHL, therefore, could
provide incentives for states to conduct similar covert operations with
the case of Crimea serving as a precedent.
It is reported that Russia's strategy employed in Crimea is part
of a larger security policy that was launched by Putin in 2012.144 This
new strategy, referred to as "smart defense," includes new approaches
to the use of armed force, such as the mixing of special forces from
various ministries to support regular troops, as well as "a mix of
political, diplomatic, informational and military interaction," with the
result of "causing confusion and speculation among various actors." 145
Similarly, NATO has referred to the methods employed by Russia in
the Crimean Crisis as "hybrid warfare" 146 or "unattributed warfare."
It has also announced to prepare its member states and partner
nations, which have a substantial Russian population, to counter
such warfare. One of the means to attribute fighters to an aggressor
state should be, for example, intelligence improvement. 147
Yet, enhancing intelligence facilities and international cooperation to counter such new threats alone may not be enough. Amending
the current legal framework would significantly contribute to countering such "unattributed warfare."
In this regard, mention should be made of an article by Christopher Kutz about the relationship between soldiers and their state
viewed from a philosophical and ethical perspective. Kutz argues that
the special problem of nonuniformed combatants and the general
problem of justifying war are linked with each other. 148 Seeing war as
a state of "collective violence" where acts are only imputable when
committed by the armed forces of a state, 149 he concludes that the
relationship between such privileged combatants and their state,

144.
See Jacob W. Kipp & Roger McDermott, Putin's Smart Defense: Wars,
Rumors of War, and Generations of Wars (PartOne), 11 EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, no.
104, June 10, 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx-ttnews%5btt
news%5d=42480&txttnews%5bbackPid%5d=756&no-cache=1#.VBzNtUtV64h
[http://
perma.cc/3QDP-75M4] (archived Oct. 13, 2015).
145.
Id.
146.
See Press Release, NATO, Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads
of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Wales ¶ 13 (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official texts
112964.htm?selectedLocale=en [http://perma.cc/JV44-6PNQ] (archived Oct. 13, 2015)
(explaining hybrid warfare in thirteen points as "threats, where a wide range of overt
and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly
integrated design").
147.
See Breedlove, supra note 1.
148.
See Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence
in Criminal Law and War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 148 (2005).
149.
See id. at 152, 160.
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therefore, should also be established through an external mark. Such
a "stamp of ownership" would render the external quality of their
50
actions attributable to the state rather than to themselves.
Transposing this moral or ethical obligation into a legal norm
would certainly foster legal clarity, foreseeability, and certaintyprinciples that not only underlie domestic law but also are fundamental considerations in international law. If anything, the promulgation
of a rule prohibiting the use of unmarked forces in an armed conflict,
in which a foreign state seeks to deceive another about its involvement, would present an opportunity to reconcile the rapid development of such new methods and strategies of warfare with the law of
armed conflicts.
On the other hand, more convincing arguments can be made in
favor of maintaining the current rules like they are. First, viewed
from a functional perspective, it is doubtful whether an explicit prohibition of unattributed warfare (as illegal perfidy) would really serve
to enhance the protective function of IHL. The prohibition of such
conduct would certainly serve the interests of the adversarial party to
identify its specific enemy. But serving state interests is not a function that modern IHL is aimed to serve. IHL is rather aimed to serve
humanitarian purposes-to spare the civil population as much as
possible from the atrocities of war by restricting certain means of
warfare. It is doubtful whether a prohibition of the use of unmarked
soldiers by a foreign state in an armed conflict would actually enhance protection of the civilian population.
Moreover, it goes without saying that an amendment of the
current IHL treaties, especially the Geneva Conventions, would be
extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, since all state parties
would have to consent to it.
While in some areas, corrections and clarifications of existing
rules are advisable,15 1 other norms are more effective when defined
only vaguely, thus allowing some flexibility in their interpretation
and application. This is especially true for borderline situations in
which it is necessary to pay attention to the specific nature and
circumstances of each individual case. Furthermore, it is extremely
difficult to transpose all potential factual behavior into legal norms
and to not define the legal rule too narrowly. For these reasons, it is

See id. at 160-161.
150.
For example, one could think of including new rules concerning the use of
151.
new weapon technologies or, in general, to enhance better compliance and enforcement
mechanisms and thereby prompting greater observance of IHL. See generally Colloquium, Technological Challenges for the HumanitarianLegal Framework, 11th Bruges
https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/
2010,
21-22,
October
Colloquium
uploads/page/collegium_41_O.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VQX-DNUK] (archived Oct. 13,
2015) (discussing technological challenges for IHL).
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preferable to maintain just a general framework that sets out only
generally defined standards, thus leaving room to consider the specifics of each case.
The current set of rules, which distinguishes between perfidy
and ruses of war, is a well-shaped compromise between precision and
clarity on the one hand and the necessary flexibility regarding its
application as to the specific circumstances of each case on the other
hand. It remains the task of the states and international courts and
tribunals to apply and interpret these provisions and to fill them with
concrete substance.
Finally, under international law, there is a more effective way to
adapt the legal regime to include new developments than a formal
treaty amendment. This is by way of customary law through a general state practice carried out with a sense of legal obligation.
Through their practice, states could produce legally binding guidelines for the interpretation of perfidy and ruses of war for future
cases. This requires an active process in which states unequivocally
condemn certain methods of warfare as unlawful.
In the case of Crimea, so far, most of the states have confined
themselves to protesting against the illegality of the use of force by
Russia after the official authorization by the Russian Council and the
incorporation of Crimea into Russian territory. However, while some
international actors like NATO have addressed the problem of unattributed warfare and the use of unmarked soldiers from a practical
perspective, they have not clearly legally characterized it as a violation of IHL. Because of this, they have missed the opportunity to
further develop international customary law though subsequent
practice.

